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Richards: Contractualist Impartiality in the American Struggle for Justice:

CONTRACTUALIST IMPARTIALITY IN THE AMERICAN
STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE: A COMMENT ON PROFESSOR
ALLEN'S "SOCIAL CONTRACT THEORY
IN AMERICAN CASE LAW'
DavidA.J Richards*
How, ifat all, does social contract theory interpretively clarify American
public and private law? Dean Allen's article takes as its starting point the
premise that some form of social contract theory underlies the founding of
the American constitutional republic, and then inquires into how that theory
can be useful in understanding the later development ofAmerican case law.
She gathers a broad range of case law in various domains and makes many
pointed observations, both constructive and critical, about the role social
contract theory ostensibly plays in those decisions, including some dissents.
Her critical points include concerns that some forms of social contract
theory were used to rationalize injustices (e.g., slavery in the antebellum
period), and even today, such theories are sometimes insufficiently selfconscious about their role in the uncritical naturalization of injustice.
My comment starts from doubts about both the over-inclusiveness and
under-inclusiveness of Dean Allen's methodology of selecting cases for
examination and then explores some critical consequences of her failure to
identify and explore many examples of the role of contractualism in
advancing the struggle for justice under American public law. Important
among these examples are the struggles against religious intolerance,
racism, sexism, and homophobia.
I begin by noting a methodological concern about Dean Allen's
selection of data points for her inquiry. Her methodology of selection, as
I understand it, consisted of searching case law (as data points) for terms
of expressions like "social contract," "state of nature," "John Rawls's A
Theory ofJustice," and other similar items. This is a familiar and reasonable
technique for conventional legal research guided by the well accepted
doctrinal categories into which areas of substantive public and private law
are organized (for example, strict liability or negligence standards in the law
of torts). Dean Allen's inquiry, though, is meta-interpretive, seeking larger
patterns ofnormative argument (associated with social contracttheory) that
organize and explain case law in and across numerous substantive areas of
public and private law. There are, of course, no well accepted substantive
categories of doctrine ("social contract," or "state of nature") available for
such an inquiry, and it may be a somewhat misleading guide to conduct a
* Edwin D. Webb Professor of Law, New York University. A.B., 1966, Harvard
University; Ph.D., 1970, Oxford University; J.D., 1971, Harvard University.
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review of relevant data points on this model.
In order to see this critique clearly, we need to understand the substance
of social contract theory. In the form of such theory prominently associated
withthe work of John Rawls, contractualism offers both an abstract test for
acceptable normative principles and a substantive argument about how
those principles should be understood and elaborated.' The path-breaking
importance of Rawls's contractualism was its proposal, on this basis, of a
reasonable defense of substantive principles ofjustice that were pointedly
anti-utilitarian.
Until Rawls, the dominant moral and political philosophy in Britain and
America had been utilitarianism; moral and political matters were, on this
view, to be evaluated in terms ofwhether they led to the greatest aggregate
of pleasure over pain of all sentient creatures. The consequence was that,
in principle, the pains or deprivations of a few would be acceptable to the
extent that a greater net aggregate of pleasure over pain was secured.
Rawls's argument was that such a substantive principle could not be
reasonably justifiable to all, consistent with the contractualist test because,
inter alia,alternative principles would better secure basic human interests
against the kinds of sacrifice that utilitarian aggregation would otherwise
require. Such alternative principles included a principle guaranteeing a
greatest equal liberty of certain basic rights (including rights of conscience,
speech, and intimate life) consistent with a like liberty of all. The antiutilitarian normative force of this principle was shown by the fact that its
normative demands fully applied even when utilitarian aggregation would
otherwise require that they yield.
Social contract theory had, of course, existed in diverse historical forms
before the publication ofRawls' sA Theory ofJustice in 1971.2 These forms
expressed quite diverse substantive political positions, including Thomas
Hobbes's defense of monarchical absolutism3 and John Locke's argument
for constitutional democracy.' Some of these positions, including that of
Locke, were implicitly utilitarian;5 none of them defended anything remotely
as demanding, as a principle of social and economic justice, as Rawls's
difference principle.6 Rawls's contractualism made such an original
1. See JOHN RAwLs, A T-EoRY

OF JUSTICE (1971);

cf.DAvmA.J. RIcHARDs, A THEORY

OF REASONS FOR ACTION (1971).
2. See also JOHN RAWLS, PoLrnCAL LIBERAuSM

(1996).
3. See THOMAS HOBBES, LEvIATHAN (Michael Oakeshott ed., Collier-MacMillan
Publishers 1960) (1651).
4. See JOHN LOCKE, Second Treatise of Government, in LocKE's Two TREATISES OF
GOVERNMENT 285 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge University Press 1960) (1690).
5. See JoHN COLMAN, JoHNILOCKE's MORALPHmosoPHY (1983) (discussing this point).
6. See RAwLS,supra note 1, at 75-83 (roughly requiring, within the constraints ofthe equal
liberty principle, that the distribution of economic goods be judged in terms of making worst off
classes better off than any alternative distribution).
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contribution to moral and political philosophy because it interpreted
contractualism in a new way-one that was not only pointedly antiutilitarian and clearly committed to a distinctive rights-respecting form of
constitutional democracy (centering on the protection of the inalienable
right to conscience), but also one that espoused a social democratic role of
the state in securing the basic interests of the most disadvantaged classes.7
Thus, the interpretive relevance ofRawls's contractualism to American
public and private law cannot be reduced to the labels of traditional social
contract theory, which his contractualism not only reconceives but also
contests in significant ways. The interpretive question is not engaged by a
method that depends on labels like "social contract" or "state of nature."
The point is not that these labels hinder conveyance of the anti-utilitarian,
social democratic principles of Rawls's contractualism, but that such
principles may better interpretively clarify American law without being
bound by such labels (including "John Rawls's A Theory of Justice"). The
labels are likely to be both seriously over-inclusive (identifying data points
that do not reflect the relevant forms ofcontractualist argument) and underinclusive (no such labels being invoked though the underlying pattern of
argument is importantly contractualist).
Any overviiew of the sort Dean Allen undertakes should be clear on two
points: first, it should identify the substantive normative character of the
contractualist moral and political philosophy that one is investigating; and
second, it should explain the relevant tests by which one judges whether a
body of law is interpretively clarified in light of such a philosophy. To
address the first point, one needs more than labels; one needs to-explore the
character of the philosophical claims that are being distinctively made (for
example, as in the case of Rawls's contractualism, its anti-utilitarian
character defined by the derivation of a substantive principle of equal
respect for basic human rights that enjoys priority over arguments of
utilitarian aggregation). To address the second point, one needs a
perspective on interpretation founded in general legal interpretation.8
Two plausible tests for the adequacy of a theory of legal interpretation
regarding a body of case law are, first, that the theory fit the line of
authoritative case law in a certain substantive domain over time, and

7. I limit my discussion here to the distinctive structure and principles of Rawls's
contractualism as the theory that has pivotally transformed the way in which political philosophy
is understood. A fuller discussion would include later developments of contractualist argument
that, while accepting the rights-respecting feature of his account, challenge some aspects of
Rawls's views, in particular, his social democratic conception ofeconomic redistribution. For one
such development, see DAvID GAUTHIER, MORALS BY AGREEmNT (1986).
8. See RONALD DWORKIn, LAW'S EMPIRE (1986); see also DAVID A.J. RICHARDS,
TOLFRATON AND THE CONSTTUTiON (1986) [hereinafter RICHARDS, TOLERATION] (applying this

methodology to issues of American Constitutionalism).
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second, where the case law is indeterminate or in some tension, that the
theory elucidate how the case law should be understood and developed in
terms of the excavation of the more abstract values or background rights
that organize a body of law.9 The relevance of contractualist political
philosophy to legal interpretation is particularly important in the second test
to the extent that such philosophy better elucidates the nature and weight
of such background rights, and affords a better guide as to how case law
should be elaborated.
We can only assess whether contractualism meets this interpretive test
by investigating whether its structure of argument clarifies the background
rights implicit in a body of law and, on this basis, assists us in understanding
and evaluating how case law has developed and should continue to develop.
If contractualism meets this test in some domain, it will be a valid
interpretive theory because it better clarifies the nature and weight of the
relevant principles of law. Nothing in the appearance of labels guarantees
the existence of such contractualist argument. We need not labels but an
interpretive methodology that calls forthe detailed exploration ofstructures
of legal argument, examining whether such argument rests on the identity
and weighting of considerations in the way that contractualism requires.
Contractualism has plausible and illuminating interpretive uses to the extent
it helps us identify and weigh considerations in legal argument that other
interpretive approaches cannot reasonably explain.
It may be helpful to illuminate the force of this interpretive method by
considering at least one example of its contractualist application mentioned
several times by Dean Allen- namely, my use of contractualism in the
interpretation of central substantive doctrines of American public law.
There are now four books in print that illustrate the character of this
approach: Tolerationand the Constitution;"° Foundationsof American
Constitutionalism; Conscienceandthe Constitution;"z and, most recently,
Women, Gays, and the Constitution.3 The closer examination of their
approach not only casts light on how the interpretive contribution of
contractualism should be understood, but also shows, as a related matter,
how contractualism can reasonably deal with several of the objections that
Dean Allen makes to it.

9. See DWORKIN, supranote 8; RICHARDS, TOLERATION, supra note 8.
10. See Richards, TOLERA1ION, supra note 8.
11. See DAVID A.J. RICHARDS, FOUNDATIONS OF AMERICAN CONSTrIUIONALiSM (1989)
[hereinafter RICHARDS, FOUNDATIONS].
12. See DAVID A.J. RICHARDS, CONSCIENCE AND THE CONSTrTON: HISTORY, THEORY,
AND LAW OF THE REcoNSTRUCTIONAMENDMENTS (1993) [hereinafter RICHARDS, CONSCIENCE].
13. See DAVID A.J. RICHARDS, WOMEN, GAYS, AND THE CONSTITIrON: THE GROUNDS FOR
FEMINISM AND GAYRIGHTS IN CULTURE AND LAW (1998) [hereinafter RICHARDS, WOMEN, GAYS
AND THE CONSTITUHON].
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The first of these, Tolerationand the Constitution, sought to excavate
a structure of argument common to three important contemporary
substantive doctrines of judicially enforceable public law principles:
religious liberty, free speech, and constitutional privacy. My use of
contractualism here was to make interpretive sense both of the historical
centrality to the American conception of constitutional rights of conscience,
speech, and intimate life and of how the scope of protection of these rights
has been and should be developed in contemporary circumstances.
Contemporary contractualist theory afforded a good interpretive
understanding of these matters because it explains, better than alternative
normative theories, two crucial features of these constitutional
developments: first, why certain basic human rights have reasonably been
accorded a higher level of constitutional protection from state abridgment;
and second, the heavy burden of secular justification constitutionally
required to legitimately abridge such basic rights. It was neither a necessary
nor sufficient condition of the validity of this approach that any particular
forms of words was used in the relevant case law and other materials
examined. The interpretive force of that account, to the extent it has force,
derives from the way in which it shows how contemporary contractualist
theory advances understanding of how basic rights of American
constitutional law had, as a matter of principle, been reasonably elaborated
in contemporary circumstances.
It is certainly true that both Toleration and the Constitution and the
next work, Foundations of American Constitutionalism, used
contemporary contractualist philosophy to clarify the historical role that
forms of social contract argument played in framing both substantive
doctrines 4 and the broad ambitions of American constitutionalism. 5 But,
these historical matters were given an interpretive sense in the terms and
from the perspective of contemporary contractualist theory, drawing on
principles and distinctions (deontological versus utilitarian argument) not
available to some previous contractualist philosopher . Nothing in the
validity of this interpretive construction turned on the use of any form of
words in the materials examined, but rather on the ways in which the
account advanced deeper understanding of the rights-based principles
implicit in those materials and their progressive elaboration over time.
Foundationsof American Constitutionalism and the two works that
followed (Conscience and the Constitution and Women, Gays, and the
Constitution) increasingly explored the interpretive significance for
American constitutionalism of a distinction between two quite different
roles for contractualism in American public argument. These were noted by

14. See RicHARDs, TOLERATION, supranote 8, at chs. 4-5.
15. See generally RIcHARDs, FouNDATIONS, supra note 11.
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Dean Allen: the difference between the role of contractualism as a
justification for revolution, and its use in the interpretation of the
constitution established in the wake of that revolution. In particular, one
use of contractualism is of some concern to Dean Allen, namely, the use of
debased forms of social contract argument in the antebellum period to
rationalize both American slavery and racism. Dean Allen's point, while
valid as far as it goes, should be seen in a larger perspective on the history
of American constitutionalism. Such a perspective suggests that, on
balance, contractualism was among the most pivotally important normative
resources that have energized and empowered the progressive rights-based
emancipation of African-Americans and other unjustly treated groups,
making possible a dissenting moral discourse that has recurrently challenged
and transformed constitutional discourse on grounds of justice.
To understand this matter, it is necessary to distinguish two quite
different roles that contractualism has played in American public life. First,
there is contractualism as an abstract political theory of legitimate
government-requiring that any political order must, as a condition of its
legitimacy, respect the basic human rights of all and mobilize political
power to pursue aims of justice and public good. When governments
seriously fail to respect conditions of legitimate government and supply no
adequate remedies for injustice, resistance and revolution may be justified
in order to secure a form of government that better meets these conditions
of legitimacy. Contractualism, thus understood, is a normative theory of
revolutionary constitutionalism.
But second, in the light of and as a response to such revolutions,
contractualism, as a normative theory of revolutionary constitutionalism,
has been domesticated, sometimes corruptly, to rationalize American
constitutional institutions in ways that are inconsistent with its true
normative demands as a theory of revolutionary constitutionalism. During
the periods of such corruption, the force ofcontractualism is often seen not
in dominant political and constitutional institutions, but in dissenting
movements that, on contractualist grounds, challenge the legitimacy of such
dominant institutions.
Dean Allen mentions the importance of such revolutionary
constitutionalism at the time of the American Revolution and the resulting
founding of the United States Constitution, but I believe an equally
important and probably even more legitimate expression of such
revolutionary constitutionalism underlay the Civil War and its culminating
constitutional manifestations, the Reconstruction Amendments.
FoundationsofAmerican Constitutionalismmade such an argument about
the founding; and Conscience and the Constitution offered a comparable
argument about abolitionist dissent leading to the Civil War and
Reconstruction Amendments. In both cases, I argued that an increasingly
decadent form of constitutionalism (the British Constitution, or the
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6

Richards: Contractualist Impartiality in the American Struggle for Justice:
STRUGGLEFORJUSTICE:COMIENT ON PROFESSORALLEN

antebellum Constitution as interpreted by the Supreme Court led by Chief
Justice Taney 6 ) was challenged on contractualist grounds of revolutionary
constitutionalism: both forms of constitutionalism, condemning rightsdenying institutions for either unfair representation or slavery without
affording reasonable remedy, failed to observe the minimal conditions of
political legitimacy and thus might be revolutionarily challenged (the
American Revolution in the one case, the Civil War in the other) in order
to establish a form of constitution that was more legitimate (that is, better
secured equal respect for the basic rights of all persons and harnessed
political power to ends ofjustice and the public good).
The ambition of the Constitution of 1787, as amended by the Bill of
Rights of 1791, was to establish a constitutional order more legitimate in
this sense than the British Constitution under which the colonies had
previously been ruled. Nothing struck antebellum Americans opposed to
slavery as more appalling than that Britain (in contrast to the United States)
should have abolished the West Indian institution of slavery as early as
1833.17 The British Constitution, once condemned as illegitimate by
American revolutionaries on grounds of its betrayal of human rights, now
appeared to abolitionist Americans to be a shining example of constitutional
decency, which shamed America. Thus, radical abolitionists such as
Garrison and Phillips could now plausibly condemn the United States
Constitution as "a covenant with death and agreement with hell" and urge
disunion,"
Lincoln rejected the disunionism of the radical abolitionist view of the
Constitution. His dramatic reentry into national politics was triggered,
however, by his response in similar spirit to the Kansas-Nebraska Act of
1854 (repealing the prohibition of slavery in the territories), which had been
engineered by Senator Stephen Douglas of Illinois. 9 Douglas justified the
repeal on the basis of the principle of popular sovereignty, the right of
people in the territories to democratically decide on the issue of slavery. For
Lincoln, as for the many Americans he and others mobilized in forming the
Republican Party,2" it was plausible to admit that the Constitution protected
slavery in the states and even that it empowered Congress to pass the
Fugitive Slave Act of 1850.1 His explosion of rage at the Kansas-Nebraska

16. See Dred Scott v.Sanford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856); see also RICHARDS,CONSCIENCE, supra
note 12, at 54-57 (discussing Lincoln's cogent criticism of the decision).
17. RICHARDS, CONSCIENCE, supra note 12, at 52-53.
18. Id. at 53.
19. See id. at 52.
20. See WnU..AME. GIENAPP, THE ORIGINS OFTHEREPuBLiCANPARTY, 1852-1856 (1987).
21. Many political abolitionists, however, balked at this later claim. See, e.g., RICHARD H.
SEwELL, BALLOTS FOR FREEDOM: ANTISLAVERYPOLITICS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1837-1860, at
236 (1976).
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Act (which implausibly protected slavery in the territories) reflected a
sense, similar to the sentiments of the radical abolitionists, that American
political indifference to slavery expressed a loss of faith in the promise of
American constitutionalism and humiliated America before the world,
especially the European world:
This declaredindifference, but as I must think covert realzeal
for the spread of slavery, I can not but hate. I hate it because
of the monstrous example of slavery itself. I hate it because it
deprives our republican example of its just influence in the
world-enables the enemies of free institutions, with
plausibility, to taunt us as hypocrites-causes the real friends
of freedom to doubt our sincerity, and especially because it
forces so many really good men amongst ourselves into an
open war with the very fundamental principles of civil
liberty-criticising the Declaration of Independence, and
insisting that there is no right principle of action but selfinterest.22
For Lincoln, growing public acceptance ofthe rights skepticism of Calhoun
(who had on such grounds criticized the Declaration of IndependenceP),
now supported by northern politicians in the name of a majoritarian
interpretation of democracy (popular sovereignty), reflected a further
deepening of the crisis of constitutional morality that he had predicted in
1838 in his address to the Young Men's Lyceum. 4 Douglas was precisely
the kind of talented anti-constitutional Jacksonian politician that Lincoln
had so prophetically described.
Douglas had based the Kansas-Nebraska Act on the political principle
of popular sovereignty,25 reserving to the Supreme Court of the United
States the ultimate interpretive issue of the scope of Congressional
constitutional powers over the territories. In DredScott v. Sanford,26 the
Supreme Court of the United States adopted Calhoun's view that Congress

22. Abraham Lincoln, "Speech on Kansas-Nebraska Act," delivered at Peoria, Illinois, on

October 16, 1854, in ABRAHAM LINCOLN: SPEECHES AND WRINGS, 1832-1858, at 315 (Don E.
Fehrenbacher ed., 1989).
23. See RICHARDS, CONSCIENCE, supranote 12, at 32, 37, 39.
24. See RICHARDS, CONSCIENCE, supra note 12, at 50-51 (commenting on Lincoln's
address).
25. See Stephen A. Douglas, The Dividing Line Between Federal and Local Authority.
Popular Sovereignty in the Territories, HARPER'S NEW MONTHLY MAG., Sept 1859, 519
(exemplifying Douglas's strained attempt to justify popular sovereignty as a sound interpretation
of the American constitutional tradition). See generally ROBERT W. JOHANNSEN, STEPHEN A.
DOUGLAS (1973).
26. See 60 U.S. 393 (1856).
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could not constitutionally forbid slavery in the territories,27 and also held
that blacks "had no rights which the white man was bound to respect."28
Chief Justice Taney's opinion for the Court was self-consciously
originalist: "[the Constitution] must be construed now as it was understood
at the time of its adoption."' But Taney's appeal-in a style of originalism
above factionalized politics that self-consciously imitated The Federalist
No. 49 30 -was itself the ultimate triumph ofthe factionalized reading of the
Founders that Lincoln so feared. Calhoun's rights skepticism triumphed in
Dred Scott with a vengeance, giving a reading both of the powers of
Congress and of the rights of black Americans that Justice Curtis showed
in his dissent to be without solid basis in history, precedent, or text.3 '
Lincoln's anxieties now extended not only to ambitious politicians without
constitutional scruples, but to the institution that proponents of the theory
of Union had historically supposed to be the most pivotally important of
national deliberative institutions, the Supreme Court of the United States
itself.32 If the Supreme Court could so willfully distort the memory of the
Founders, the time had come to challenge American institutions-on the
ground ofAmerica's revolutionary constitutionalism-for failure to protect
the basic rights of the person.
Lincoln rose to make this challenge in the Lincoln-Douglas
debates 33 -"one of the most important intellectual discussions of the
slavery question that occurred during three decades ofalmost uninterrupted
controversy. ' 34 Lincoln certainly believed and argued cogently that Dred
Scott was wrongly decided, 35 but the burning issue of public reason that he

27. See JOHN C. CALHOUN, SPEECH ON THE OREGONBILL, reprintedin THE WORKS OFJOHN
C. CALHOUN 479-512 (Richard K. Cralle ed.) (1854) (explaining Calhoun's views).
28. DredScott, 60 U.S. at 407.
29. Id. at 426.
30. See THE FEDERAUST No. 49, at 338-43 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961);
see also RICHARDS, FOUNDATIONS, supra note 11, at 4, 102, 132-34, 149, 168,288,290.
31. See DredScott,60 U.S. at 564 (Curtis, J., dissenting); see also DONE. FEHRENBACHER,
THE DRED SCOTr CASE: ITS SIGNIFICANCE IN AMERICAN LAW AND POLrrICs (1978) (for the
authoritative contemporary discussion of the background and fallacies of the opinion).
32. See RICHARDS, CONSCIENCE, supranote 12, at 42-57 (discussing more fully the theory

of Union).
33. See THE LINCOLN-DOUGLAS DEBATES OF 1858 (Robert W. Johannsen ed., 1965).
34. DAVIDM.PoI-rERTHEIMPENDINGCRISIS,1848-1861,at331 (DonE.Fehrenbachered.,

1976); see also HARRY V. JAFFA, CRISIS OF THE HOUSE DIVIDED: AN INTERPRETATION OF THE
ISSUES INTHE LINCOLN-DOUGLAS DEBATES (1954); POTrER, supra,at 328-55; DAVID ZAREFSKY,
LINCOLN DOUGLAS AND SLAVERY: IN THE CRUCIBLE OF PUBLIC DEBATE (1990) (for excellent
commentary and analysis).
35. See Abraham Lincoln, ADDRESS AT COOPER INSTITUTE, NEW YORK CITY, (Feb. 27,
1860), reprintedin DONE. FEHRENBACHER,ABRAHAMLINCOLN: SPEECHES AND WRITNGS 111-30
(1989) (stating Lincoln's most expansive historical defense ofthis view). FortheLincoln-Douglas
debates, see LINCOLN-DOUGLASDEBATES, supra note 33, at 54-67,145-59,197-200,255,279-81,
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placed unforgettably before the conscience of the nation was the enormity
ofthe abandonment ofthe rights-based morality ofAmerican revolutionary
constitutionalism implicit in the majoritarianism of Douglas and the
originalism of Taney:
When he [Douglas] invites any people, willing to have slavery,
to establish it, he is blowing out the moral lights around us.
When he says he "cares not whether slavery is voted down or
voted up"-that it is a sacred right of self-government-he is,
in my judgment, penetrating the human soul and eradicating
the light of reason and the love of liberty in this American
people.36
The consequence of such a view was grotesque distortion not only of
the history of American revolutionary constitutionalism (for example,
Douglas's 37 and Taney's38 claim that Jefferson could not have meant the
Declaration ofIndependence to apply to black Americans),39 but also of the
essential moral meaning of the Declaration that "there is no just rule other
than that of moral and abstract right!"4 The interpretive consequence of
such crippling rights skepticism would be preparation ofthe public mind of
the nation for a "new Dred Scott decision, deciding against the right of the
people of the States to exclude slavery"41 ; for, "to prepare the public mind
for this movement, operating in the free States, where, there is now an
abhorrence of the institution of slavery, could you find an instrument so
capable of doing it as Judge Douglas? or one employed in so apt a way to
do it?"42
Lincoln's point was cogent. Such a decision would be as interpretively
wrong as DredScott itself, but its acceptability would be prepared, just as
Dred Scott was prepared, by the further elaboration of the rights skeptical
subversion of American constitutional morality by politicians like Douglas
and judges like Taney, both products and instruments of Jacksonian

301-02, 320-22.

36. See Abraham Lincoln, in LINCOLN-DOUGLAS

DEBATES,

supra note 33, at 67 (first

debate, Ottawa, Aug. 21, 1858).
37. See Stephen Douglas, in LINCOLN-DOUGLAS DEBATES, supra note 33, at 215-16
(delivered at Galesburg debate, Oct. 7, 1858); see also Douglas,supranote 25, at 521, 522, 527,
529 (exemplifying Douglas's attempt to argue that popular sovereignty was implicit in American

revolutionary constitutionalism).
38. See DredScott, 60 U.S. at 409-10.

39. See Abraham Lincoln, in

LINCOLN-DOUGLAS DEBATES,

supra note 33, at 219-20

(delivered at Galesburg, Oct. 7 1858).
40. Id. at 221.

41. Id.
42. Abraham Lincoln, in LINCOLN-DOUGLAS DEBATES, supranote 33, at 233.
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democracy. 43 Lincoln concluded the debates starkly:
That is the issue that will continue in this country when these
poor tongues of Judge Douglas and myself shall be silent. It is
the eternal struggle between these two principles-right and
wrong-throughout the world.... The one is the common
right of humanity and the other the divine right of kings....
It is the same spirit that says, "You work and toil and earn
bread, and I'll eat it." No matter in what shape it comes,
whether from the mouth of a king who seeks to bestride the
people of his own nation and live by the fruit of their labor, or
from one race of men as an apology for enslaving another
race, it is the same tyrannical principle. 44
Lincoln made his appeal to the revolutionary foundations of American
constitutionalism within the framework of the constitutional institutions of
deliberative public argument that he cherished. Though he lost the election
for the Senate of 1858, 4 he became a national figure and won the
Presidency in 1860, in part because of such arguments.4 6 He made clear in
his first inaugural address-consistent with the constitutional theory of
union-that he believed secession to be unconstitutional and the South's
claim to a moral-right of revolution to be frivolous.47
The election of 1860 had been conducted as a form of majority rule
embedded in constitutional institutions according full protection for "[a]ll
' A democratic election,
the vital rights of minorities, and of individuals."48
conducted within such a framework, was politically and constitutionally
legitimate, and must be respected.49 The South must now abide by the fair
rules of the game and could not justly or constitutionally withdraw because
it had fairly lost one play. Lincoln had argued to the American people that
their politicians and judges had so betrayed their constitutionalism that their
rights were not adequately protected. That was a revolutionary claim made
in the context of democratic elections, and his success indicated that other
forms of revolutionary action were not yet necessary. In fact, some of the

43. See generallyARTHuRM. SCHLESINGER, JR., THEAGE OF JACKSON (1945) (explaining

some of the egalitarian merits of Jacksonian democracy).
44. Abraham Lincoln, in LNCOLN-DOUGLAS DEBATEs, supranote 33, at 319 (delivered at
Alton on Oct. 15, 1858).
45. See generallyDONE. FEHRENBACHER, PRELUDE TO GREATNESS: LINCOLNIN THE 1850s

(1962).
46. See LINCOLN-DOUGLAS DEBATES, supra note 33, at v-vi.
47. See Abraham Lincoln, "First Inaugural Address" (delivered Mar. 4, 1861), reprintedin
II ABRAHAM LINCOLN, supra note 22, at 219-20.
48. Id. at219.
49. See generally DAVID M. POarI-, LINCOLN AND HIS PARTY IN THE SECESSION CRISIS
(1942) (discussing Lincoln's views and actions during this period).
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more pessimistic abolitionists were right. America, in the face of a Southern
sectional intransigence that now sought to entrench its violations of human
and constitutional rights behind the wall of the Confederacy beyond any
possibility of remedy by United States constitutional institutions, ° was ripe
for revolutionary action in the name of the rights-based Constitution. The
Civil War, the Second American Revolution and the resulting
Reconstruction Amendments, would be publicly justified in such terms.5 '
During the antebellum period, the public mind of the nation had been
prepared for Lincoln's arguments not by dominant constitutional
institutions, which often tried to silence such discussion, 2 but by a complex
movement of moral and eventually political protest, the abolitionist
movement, a movement examined in depth in Conscience and the
Constitution.3 During a period of increasingly dominant and politically and
judicially successful constitutional decadence like antebellum
constitutionalism, the abolitionist movement not only kept alive
contractualist ideals of revolutionary constitutionalism (demanding respect
for universal human rights), but it also developed an increasingly profound
analysis of how democratic political power, under an ostensibly rightsbased republican constitution, corruptively entrenched and rationalized
structural injustice.5"
To understand the political force of such structural injustice, we need,
following the radical abolitionists who pioneered the analysis of structural
injustice,55 to understand its roots as a reaction to the contractualist
demands of the argument oftoleration. The argument for toleration was an
American elaboration ofthe argument for universal toleration that had been
stated, in variant forms, by Pierre Bayle and John Locke. 6 The context and
motivations of the argument were those of radical Protestant intellectual

50. See generally EMORY M. THOMAS, THE CONFEDERATE NATION: 1861-1865 (1979)
(discussing Confederate constitutionalism); seealsoDoNE. EHREmNACHmR, CONsTrrUTIONs AND
CONSTITLITIONALISM IN THE SLAVEHOLDING SOUTH (1989).

51.
52.
53.
54.

RICHARDS, CONSCIENCE, supra note 12, at ch. 4 (extensively defending this point).
See id. at 78.
Seeid. atch. 3.
See generally RICHARDS, WOMEN, GAYS, AND THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 13

(discussing the development of the conditions of structural injustice as integral to anti-Semitism,
racism, sexism, and homophobia). By structural injustice, I mean institutions and practices (like
American slavery and its underlying ideological support, racism) that, first, deprived a class of

persons of basic human rights (conscience, speech, intimate life, and work) on wholly inadequate
grounds and, second, rationalized such injustice in terms of dehumanizing stereotypes whose force
depended, in a vicious circularity, on the constraints imposed by the abridgment of basic human

rights, including abridgment of the speakers and speech that might most reasonably contest such
stereotypes.
55. See RICHARDS, CONSCIENCE, supranote 12, at 80-89 (fully discussing this point).
56. See RICHARDS, TOLERATION, supra note 8, at 89-128 (examining the argument in Locke
and Bayle and its Ameican elaboration notably by Jefferson and Madison).
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and moral conscience reflecting on the political principles requisite to
protect its enterprise against the oppressions of established churches, both
Catholic and Protestant.
That enterprise arose both from a moral ideal ofthe person and the need
to protect that ideal from a political threat that had historically crushed it.
The ideal was of respect for persons in virtue of their personal moral
powers both to assess and pursue ends rationally and to adjust and
constrain pursuit of ends reasonably in light of the identical status of
persons as bearers of equal rights. The political threat to this ideal of the
person was the political idea and practice that the moral status of persons
was not determined by the responsible expression of their own moral
powers, but specified in advance of such reflection or the possibility of such
reflection by a hierarchical structure of society and nature in which they
were embedded. That structure, classically associated with orders of
being,57 defined roles and statuses in which people were born, lived, and
died; it further tended to exhaustively specify the responsibilities of living
in light of those roles.
The political power of the hierarchical conception was shown not only
in the ways in which people behaved, but in the ways in which it penetrated
into the human heart and mind, framing a personal, moral, and social
identity founded on roles specified by the hierarchical structure. The
structure-religious, economic, political-did not need to achieve its ends
by massive coercion precisely because its crushing force on human
personality had been rendered personally and socially invisible by a heart
that felt and mind that imaginatively entertained nothing that could render
the structure an object of critical reflection. There could be nothing that
might motivate such reflection (life being perceived, felt, and lived as richly
natural).
In light of the moral pluralism made possible by the Reformation, liberal
Protestant thinkers like Bayle and Locke subjected the political power of
the hierarchical conception to radical ethical criticism in terms of a moral
ideal of the person having moral powers of rationality and reasonableness;
the hierarchical conception had subverted the ideal, and, for this reason,
distorted the standards of rationality and reasonableness to which the ideal
appealed. Both Bayle and Locke argued as religious Christians. Their
argument naturally arose as an intramural debate among interpreters of the
Christian tradition about freedom and ethics. An authoritative Pauline
strand of that tradition had given central weight to the value of Christian
freedom."8 That tradition, like the Jewish tradition from which it developed,
had a powerful ethical core of concern for the development of moral

57. See generally ARTmUO. LovEjoy, THE GREAT CHAIN OF BEING (1964).
58. See RicHARns, ToLERATION, supranote 8, at 86-87.
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personality; Augustine of Hippo had interpreted the trinitarian nature of
God, in whose image we are made, on the model of moral personality, that
is, the three parts of the soul (will, memory, and intelligence). 59 Indeed, the
argument for toleration arose from an internal criticism by Bayle of
Augustine's argument for the persecution of the heretical Donatists; to wit,
Augustine had misinterpreted central Christian values of freedom and
ethics.6' The concern was that religious persecution had corrupted ethics
and, consequently, the essence of Christianity's elevated and simple ethical
core of a universal brotherhood of free people.
The argument for toleration was a judgment of and response to
perceived abuses of political epistemology. The legitimation of religious
persecution by both Catholics and Protestants rendered a politically
entrenched view of religious and moral truth the measure of permissible
ethics and religion, including the epistemic standards of inquiry and debate.
By the late seventeenth century (when Locke and Bayle wrote), there was
good reason to believe that politically entrenched views of religious and
moral truth (resting on the authority ofthe Bible and associated interpretive
practices) assumed essentially contestable interpretations of a complex
historical interaction among Pagan, Jewish, and Christian cultures in the
early Christian era.6
The Renaissance awareness of Pagan culture and learning reopened the
question of how the Christian synthesis of Pagan philosophical and Jewish
ethical and religious culture was to be understood. Among other things, the
development of critical historiography and techniques of textual
interpretation had undeniable implications for Bible interpretation.62 The
Protestant Reformation both assumed and further encouraged these new
modes of inquiry, and also encouraged the appeals to experiment and
experience that were a matrix for the methodologies associated with the
rise of modern science.63 These new approaches to thought and inquiry had
made possible the recognition that there was a gap between the politically
entrenched conceptions of religious and moral truth and inquiry and the
kinds of reasonable inquiries that the new approaches made available. The
argument for tolerance arose from the recognition of the disjunction
between the reigning political epistemology and the new epistemic
methodologies.
The crux of the problem was this. Politically entrenched conceptions of
truth had, on the basis of the Augustinian legitimation of religious

59. See id. at 85-88.
60. See id. at 89-95.
61. See id. at 25-27.
62. See id. at 125-26.

63. See generally Pu rIANiSM AND THE RISE OFMODERN SCINCE: THEMERTON THESiS (I.
Bernard Cohen ed., 1990) (providing a recent review of the question).
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persecution, made themselves the measure both of the standards of
reasonable inquiry and of who could count as a reasonable inquirer after
truth. But, in light of the new modes of inquiry available, such political
entrenchment of religious truth was seen often to rest on the degradation
of reasonable standards of inquiry and on the self-fulfilling degradation of
the capacity of persons to conduct such inquiries reasonably. In order to
rectify these evils, the argument for tolerance forbade, as a matter of
principle, the enforcement by the state of any such conception of religious
truth. The scope of legitimate political concern must, rather, rest on the
pursuit of general ends like life and basic rights and liberties. The pursuit of
such goods was consistent with the full range of ends free people might
rationally and reasonably pursue."
A prominent feature of the argument for tolerance was its claim that
religious persecution corrupted conscience itself-a critique we have
already noted in the American abolitionist thinkers who assume the
argument. Such corruption, a kind of self-induced blindness to the evils one
inflicts, is a consequence of the political enforcement at large of a
conception of religious truth that immunizes itself from independent
criticism in terms of reasonable standards of thought and deliberation. In
effect, the conception of religious truth, though perhaps having once been
importantly shaped by more ultimate considerations of reason, ceases to be
held or to be understood and elaborated on the basis of reason.
A tradition, that loses its sense of reasonable foundations, stagnates and
depends increasingly for allegiance on question-begging appeals to
orthodox conceptions of truth and the violent repression of any dissent
from such conceptions as a kind of disloyal moral treason. The politics of
loyalty rapidly degenerates, as it did in the antebellum South's repression
of any criticism of slavery, into a politics that takes pride in widely held
community values solely because they are community values. Standards of
discussion and inquiry become increasingly parochial and insular; they serve
only a polemical role in the defense of the existing community values and
are indeed increasingly hostile to any more impartial reasonable assessment
in light of independent standards.65
Such politics tends towards forms of irrationality in order to protect its
now essentially polemical project. Opposing views relevant to reasonable
public argument are suppressed, facts distorted or misstated, values
disconnected from ethical reasoning, indeed deliberation in politics
denigrated in favor of violence against dissent and the aesthetic glorification
of violence. Paradoxically, the more the tradition becomes seriously
64. See RiCHARDS, TOLERATnON, supra note 8, at 119-20.
65. SeegenerallyJOHNHOPEFRANKUN,THEMIrTANTSouTH1800-1861(1956);BERTRAM
WYATr-BROWN, HONOR AND VIOLENCE IN THE OLD SouTH (1986); cf. W.J. CASH, THE MIND OF

THE SouTH (1941).
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vulnerable to independent reasonable criticism (arguably, increasing in
rational need of such criticism), the more it is likely to generate forms of
political irrationality (including scapegoating of outcast dissenters) in order
to secure allegiance.
I call this phenomenon the paradox of intolerance. The paradox is to be
understood by reference to the epistemic motivations of Augustinian
intolerance. A certain conception of religious truth was originally affirmed
as true and politically enforced on society at large because it was supposed
to be the epistemic measure of reasonable inquiry (i.e., more likely to lead
to epistemically reliable beliefs). But the consequence of the legitimation of
such intolerance over time was that standards of reasonable inquiry, outside
the orthodox measure of such inquiry, were repressed. In effect, the
orthodox conception of truth was no longer defended on the basis of
reason, but was increasingly hostile to reasonable assessment in terms of
impartial standards not hostage to the orthodox conception. Indeed,
orthodoxy was defended as an end in itself, increasingly by non-rational and
even irrational means of appeal to community identity and the like.
The paradox appears in the subversion of the original epistemic
motivations of the Augustinian argument. Rather than securing reasonable
inquiry, the argument now has cut off the tradition from such inquiry.
Indeed, the legitimacy ofthe tradition feeds on irrationalism precisely when
it is most vulnerable to reasonable criticism, contradicting and frustrating
its original epistemic ambitions (thus, the sense of paradox in such selfdefeating epistemic incoherence).
The history of religious persecution amply illustrates these truths; and,
as the abolitionists clearly saw, no aspect of that history more clearly so
than Christian anti-Semitism. The relationship ofChristianity with its Jewish
origins has always been a tense one. 6 The fact that many Jews did not
accept Christianity was a kind of standing challenge to the reasonableness
of Christianity, especially in the early period (prior to its establishment as
the church of the late Roman Empire) when Christianity was a proselytizing
religion that competed for believers with the wide range of religious and
philosophical belief systems available in the late Pagan world.
In his recent important studies of anti-Semitism,67 the medievalist Gavin
Langmuir characterizes as anti-Judaism Christianity's long-standing worries

66. See JOHN G. GAGER, THE ORIGINS OF ANTI-SEMIISM: ATnTUDES TOWARD JuDAIsM IN
PAGAN AND CHRISTIAN ANTIQUITY (1983) (discussing the early Christian period). The classic
general study is LEON PouAKov, THE HISTORY OF ANTI-SEMITISM vol. 1 Richard Howard trans.
(New York: Vanguard Press, 1965); vol. 2 Natalie Gerardi trans. (New York: Vanguard Press,
1973); vol. 3 Miriam Kochan trans. (New York: Vanguard Press, 1975); vol. 4 George Klin trans.
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985).
67. See GAVIN I. LANGMUIR, TOWARD A DEFINITION OF ANTISEMrrISM (1990); GAVIN I.
LANGMUIR, HISTORY, RELIGION, AND ANTISEMrrISM (1990).
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about the Jews because of the way the Jewish rejection of Christianity
discredited the reasonableness of the Christian belief system in the Pagan
world. Langmuir argues that the Christian conception of the obduracy of
the Jews and the divine punishment of them therefore were natural forms
of anti-Judaic self-defense, resulting in the forms of expulsion and
segregation from Christian society that naturally expressed and legitimated
such judgments on the Jews.6" In contrast, Langmuir calls anti-Semitism
properthe totally baseless and irrational beliefs about ritual crucifixions and
cannibalism of Christians by Jews that were "widespread in northern
Europe by 1350";69 such belief led to populist murders of Jews usually
(though not always) condemned by both church and secular authorities. The
irrational nature of anti-Semitism proper requires, Langmuir suggests, a
distinguishing name-chimeria-that stems from the Greek root meaning
"fantasies, figments of the imagination, monsters that, although dressed
syntactically in the clothes of real humans, have never been seen and are
projections of mental processes unconnected with the real people of the
outgroup."7 °
Langmuir also suggests, as does R.I. Moore,7 that the development of
anti-Semitism proper was associated with growing internal doubts posed
by dissenters in the period between 950-1250. The doubts questioned the
reasonableness of certain Catholic religious beliefs and practices (for
example, transubstantiation) and the resolution of such doubts by the forms
of irrationalist politics associated with anti-Semitism proper (often
centering on fantasies of ritual eating of human flesh that expressed the
underlying worries about transubstantiation). The worst ravages of antiSemitism illustrate the paradox of intolerance, which explains the force of
the example for abolitionists. Precisely when the dominant religious
tradition gave rise to the most reasonable internal doubts, these doubts
were displaced from reasonable discussion and debate into blatant political
irrationalism based on chimeria against one of the more conspicuous,
vulnerable, and innocent groups of dissenters.
Langmuir's distinction between anti-Judaism and anti-Semitism proper
is an unstable one. Both attitudes rest on conceptions of religious truth that
are unreasonably enforced on the community at large. Certainly, both the
alleged obduracy of the Jews and their just punishment for such obduracy
were sectarian interpretations of the facts and not reasonably enforced at
large. Beliefs in obduracy are certainly not as unreasonable as beliefs in
cannibalism; and segregation is not as evil as populist murder or genocide.
68.
69.
70.
71.

See LANGMUm, TOWARD ADEFINITION OFANTIsEMITSM, supranote 67, at 57-62.
Id. at 302.
Id. at 334.
See, e.g., R.I. MOORE, TiE FORMATION OF A PERSECUTING SOCIETY: POWER AND
DEVIANCE IN WEsTERN EUROPE 950-1250 (1987).
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But, both forms of politics are, on grounds of the argument for tolerance,
unreasonable in principle. More fundamentally, anti-Judaism laid the
corrupt political foundation for anti-Semitism. Once it became politically
legitimate to enforce at large a sectarian conception of religious truth,
reasonable doubts about such truth were displaced from the reasonable
discussion and debate they deserved and into the irrationalist politics of
religious persecution. In the Christian West, the Jews have been the most
continuously blatant victims of that politics, making anti-Semitism "the
oldest prejudice in Western civilization ....
The radical criticism of political irrationalism implicit in the argument
for toleration, once unleashed, could not be limited to religion proper, but
was naturally extended by John Locke to embrace politics generally.73
Reflection on the injustice of religious persecution by established churches
was generalized into a larger reflection on how political orthodoxies of
hierarchical orders of authority and submission (for example, patriarchal
political theories of absolute monarchy like Filmer's74 ) had been
unreasonably enforced at large. In both religion and political theory,
political enforcement of one view not only degraded standards of argument
to the exclusive measure of the orthodox one; it also retained hold on
political power by stunting people's capacity to know, understand, and give
effect to their inalienable human rights of reasonable self-government. The
generalization of the argument for tolerance naturally suggested the
political legitimacy of some form of constitutional democracy as a political
decision procedure more likely to secure a reasonable politics that
respected human rights and pursued the common interests of all persons
alike.75
The argument for tolerance was motivated by a general political
skepticism about enforceable political epistemologies. Such politics
enforced at large sectarian conceptions of religious, moral, and political
truth at the expense of denying the moral powers ofpersons to assess these
matters in light of reasonable standards and as reasonable persons. The
leading philosophers of tolerance thus tried to articulate some criteria or
thought experiment in terms of which such sectarian views might be
assessed and debunked from a more impartial perspective. Bayle suggested
a contractualist test for such impartiality: abstracting from our native
prejudices born from the customs in which we were raised, we should ask
ourselves "Is such a practice just in itself? If it were a question of

72. LANGMum, TOWARD A DEFiNmON OF ANTISEMTSM, supra note 67, at 45.
73. See RicHARDs, TOLERAnTON, supranote 8, at 98-102; RICHARDS, FOUNDATIONS, supra
note 11, at 82-90.
74. See Robert Filmer, Patriarcha(1680), reprintedin PATRIARCHA AND OTHER WRrrINGs
1-68 (Johann P. Sommerville ed.) (1991).
75. See RIcHARDs, FOUNDATIONS, supra note 11, at 78-97.
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introducing it in a country where it would not be in use and where he would
be free to take it up or not, would one see, upon examining it impartially
that it is reasonable enough to merit being adopted?""6
Bayle's use of a contractualist test was generalized by Locke into a
comprehensive contractualist political theory.77 Though Locke is not clear
on the point, contractualism has nothing to do with history; nothing in the
argument turns on the actual existence of a state of nature, nor on ultimate
epistemological skepticism. Neither Locke nor Bayle were moral, political,
or religious skeptics; they were concerned, rather, by the unreliable appeals
to politically enforceable conceptions of sectarian truths, and they
articulated a thought experiment of abstract contractualist reasonableness
to assess what might legitimately be enforced through law. Bayle's use of
a contractualist test made this point exactly: abstracting from your own
aims and the particular customs of your society, what principles of
legitimate politics would all persons reasonably accept? The test is, of
course, very much like Rawls's abstract contractualist test in the absence
of knowledge of specific identity, and serves exactly the same political
function.7"
Such a contractualist test assumes that persons have the twin moral
powers of rationality and reasonableness in light of which they may assess
human ends-their own and others'." The principles of prudence enable us
to reflect on the coherence and completeness between our ends and the
more effective ways to pursue them, subject to principles of epistemic
rationality. The principles of moral reasonableness enable us to regulate the
pursuit of our ends in light of the common claims of all persons to the
forms of action and forbearance consistent with equal respect for our status
in the moral community. These self-originating powers of reason enable us
to think for ourselves not only from our own viewpoint but also from the
moral point of view that gives weight to the viewpoints of all others.
Reason-epistemic and practical-can have the power that it does in
our lives because it enables us to stand back from our ends, to assess
critically how they cohere with one another and with the ends of others, to
reexamine and sometimes revise such judgments in light of new insights and
experience, and to act accordingly. Reason can only reliably perform this
role when it is itself subject to revision and correction in light of public
standards that are open, accessible, and available to all. Public reason-a
resource that enables all persons to better cultivate their moral

76. PIERRE BAYLE, PHIOSOPHICAL COMENTARY 30 (Peter Lang ed., Amie Godman
Tannenbaum trans., 1987).
77. See RICHARDS, FOUNDATIONS, supranote 11, at 82-90; RICHARDS, TOLERATION, supra
note 8, at 98-102.
78. See generallyRAWLS, supra note 1.
79. See RICHARDS, supranote 1 (describing these powers more fully).
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powers-requires a public culture that sustains high standards of
independent, critically tested and testable, revisable argument accessible to
all. In order to perform the role that it should play in the exercise of our
internal moral powers, public reason cannot be merely or even mainly
polemical. It must afford sufficient public space within which we may
comfortably express what doubts we may have about our ends, lives, and
communities, and deliberatively discuss and resolve such doubts.8"
Respect of our capacity for reason, thus understood, requires a politics
that respects the principle of tolerance. Forms of traditional wisdom that
have a basis in public reason will not be politically disallowed by the
principle. The principle, however, does deny that convictions of sectarian
truth can be enforced through law solely on that basis. The principle thus
limits the force inpoliticallife of convictions that draw their strength solely
from the certainties of group loyalty and identification that tend most to
self-insulate themselves from reason when they are reasonably subject to
internal doubts, consistent with the paradox of intolerance.
Nothing in the account suggests that religious views or even convictions
about truth of dominant religions are unreasonable, but only that certain
facts of political psychology about human nature in politics lead to a kind
of political corruption ofthe religious enterprise as an inquiry into ultimate
truth. Exercises of political power enforcing views of religious truth tend
not to do so on the basis of reason. Indeed, consistent with the paradox of
intolerance, precisely when the tradition may need most to entertain,
discuss, and resolve reasonable doubts about its truth, it tends to make war
on its reasonable doubts by the despicable forms of political irrationalism
exemplified by the history of religious persecution.
Contractualism, thus understood as a hypothetical test for public reason
in politics, must tend in the nature of its enterprise to identify the more
abstract features that characterize our moral powers as reasoning agents.
Because the motivation of the entire enterprise is the degree to which the
idea and practice of hierarchical orders of authority have been permitted to
subvert our moral powers ofrationality and reasonableness, the reclamation
of such powers requires a demanding test of political legitimacy that
constrains and limits political power in the ways that we have good reason,
in light of our historical experience, to believe require limitation in order to
do justice to the reasonable demands of our moral natures.
Contractualism offers us such a test, asking us to think hypothetically
in abstraction from our current particular ends and situations about the
more general features of living a rational and reasonable life and what

80. See ONoRA O'NEILL, CONSTRUCTIONS OF REASON (1989) (discussing all these points);

see also Immanuel Kant, An Answer to the Question: "What is Enlightenment?", in KANT'S
POLnCAL WRrTNGS 55 (Hans Reiss ed., H.B. Nisbet trans., 2d ed. 1991) (stating "The public

use of man's reason must always be free ....).
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constraints on politics are required in order for all persons to be secure in
living such a life. The idea of general goods, resources, or capacities-all
familiar in the contractualist literature-are corollaries of such a test;"'they
identify the kind of abstract features of living a life that reasonable persons,
in the contractualist choice situation, would regard as properly subject to
a distributive principle of ajust politics. The principle of tolerance is one
such principle, concerned with the foundational ideas that make possible
both a politics of reason and a conception of political community that
dignifies the capacity for reasonableness of all persons to be self-governing
moral agents.
The argument for tolerance, as the normative background of central
constitutional principles of religious liberty, free speech, and privacy,82
demands first, that basic human rights be extended to all persons, and
second, that such rights only be abridged to serve a compelling secular83
justification. The forms of structural injustice (including, as I have argued,
not only religious intolerance and racism, but sexism and homophobia)
violate both these requirements. The rationalization of such injustice, in a
constitutional republic otherwise committed to the argument for toleration,
requires, as the radical abolitionists saw, the unjust enforcement at large of
a political epistemology whose force rests on the abridgment of the basic
human rights of a class of persons on wholly inadequate grounds. To
accomplish this end, the enforcement ofthe political epistemology limits the
scope of both speech and speakers to the measure of sectarian views
supportive ofthe epistemology. In effect, public debate does not include the
views and speakers who might reasonably challenge the dominant
orthodoxy. Drawing on the history of religious intolerance that the
abolitionists took so seriously, 4 I argued that such politics tends to forms
of irrationality to protect its now essentially polemical project. Opposing
views relevant to reasonable public argument are suppressed, facts distorted
or misstated, values disconnected from ethical reasoning-indeed
deliberation in politics denigrated in favor of violence against dissent and
the aesthetic glorification ofviolence. "Paradoxically, the more the tradition

81. See generally RAWLS, supra note 1; RICHARDS, supra note 1; AMARTYA SEN, THE
STANDARD OF LrvING (1987); Ronald Dworkin, What Is Equality? Part1: Equality of Welfare,
10 PHL. & PUB.AFF. 185 (1981); Ronald Dworkin, What Is Equality? Part2: Equality of
Resources, 10 PHL.& PuB. A'. 283 (1981); Ronald Dworkin, What Is Equality?Part3: The
PlaceofLiberty, 73 IOWA L. REv. 1 (1987); Ronald Dworkin, WhatIs Equality?Part4: Political
Equality, 22 U.S.F. L. REV. 1 (1987) (discussing contractualism and other theories, generally);
T.M. Scanlon, Preference and Urgency, 72 J. OF PHIL 655 (1975).
82. SeegenerallyRicHARDs,ToLERATION,supranoteS (describing this defensemore fully).
83. See generally RICHARDS, CONSCIENCE, supranote 12; RiCHARDS, WOMEN, GAYS, AND
THE CoNsTrTToN, supra note 13 (describing this defense more fully).
84. See RICHARDS, CONSCIENCE, supra note 12, at 59-73 (discussing this premise more

fully).
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becomes seriously vulnerable to independent reasonable criticism (indeed,
increasingly in rational need of such criticism), the more it is likely to
generate forms of political irrationalism (including scapegoating of outcast
dissenters) in order to secure allegiance. . ." (exemplifying the paradox of
intolerance)., 5
Conscience and the Constitution was largely preoccupied with
understanding the radical abolitionist analysis of the structural injustice of
racism and the role that analysis should play in understanding the provisions
of the Reconstruction Amendments that sprung therefrom.86 AfricanAmericans were, on this analysis, the scapegoats of southern self-doubt
about slavery in the same way European Jews had been the victims of
Christian doubt. Frederick Douglass, the leading black abolitionist, stated
the abolitionist analysis with a classical clarity:
Ignorance and depravity, and the inability to rise from
degradation to civilization and respectability, are the most
usual allegations against the oppressed. The evils most
fostered by slavery and oppression are precisely those which
slaveholders and oppressors would transfer from their system
to the inherent character oftheir victims. Thus the very crimes
of slavery become slavery's best defence. By making the
enslaved a character fit only for slavery, they excuse
themselves for refusing to make the slave a freeman.87
In effect, such structural injustice was rationalized in terms of an ostensible
natural fact, race, whose force in fact depended on structural injustice. Such
naturalization of injustice rendered invisible and unspoken the cultural
construction of such injustice and the associated ethical responsibilities of
acknowledging and rectifying such injustice. Such a vacuum ofreasonable
discourse was, instead, filled by unjust stereotypes both of race and gender
that effectively dehumanized African-Americans. The long struggle against
American cultural racism (including the attack on racial segregation) thus
importantly included growing recognition of the cultural construction of
American racism. 8
Any critical understanding of this history and its pivotal importance for
the moral growth of American public law requires us to take seriously the
two ways in which such moral growth has traditionally been resisted,
namely, the originalism of Chief Justice Taney and the majoritarianism of
85. Id. at 66-67.
86. See id. atch. 5 (attempting an admittedly under-developed analysis of gender and sexual
preference).
87. The Claims of the Negro EthnologicallyConsidered,in TBE LIFE AND WRrDNGs OF
FREDERICK DOUGLASS 2:295 (Philip S. Foner ed.,
88. See RIcHARDs, CONSCIENCE, supranote
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StephenDouglas. Accordingly, our interpretive responsibilities today must,
in light of that history, include critical resistance to the two ways in which
continuing progress is often resisted today, whether the originalism of
Bork 9 or the qualified majoritarianism of John Hart Ely.' We need as
much now as ever the responsible concern with and articulation of
normative judgments, as a matter of principle, of the progressive moral
meaning of basic, universal human rights in contemporary circumstances.
Any evasion of this interpretive responsibility (whether originalism or
majoritarianism) fails to take seriously the contractualist demands of
American constitutionalism.
In my most recent work, Women, Gays, and the Constitution, I
extended my earlier interpretive analysis of structural injustice to include
gender and sexual preference as well. To this end, I examined in some
interpretive depth the roots of such analysis in a minority (the abolitionist
feminists) within a dissenting minority (the abolitionists), and the ways in
which Walt Whitman elaborated this analysis to include homosexual love.
The abolitionist feminists thus extended the radical abolitionist analysis of
racism to include, "on the same platform of human rights,"9 1 sexism as well.

The common structural injustice turned, first, on the abridgment of basic
human rights and, second, the rationalization of such injustice on
inadequate grounds, including, in both cases, a similar naturalization of
injustice in terms of the unjust enforcement of dehumanizing stereotypes of
race or gender. Such a theory of moral slavery, as I (following the
abolitionist feminists) call it,' was extended by Whitman and others to
include issues of sexual preference.93 In all these cases, a cultural history
abridges basic human rights; and such abridgment is rationalized on
inadequate grounds (the naturalization of injustice in terms of an unjust
cultural stereotype of race, or gender, or gendered sexuality).9 4
Homosexuals occupy, in contemporary American politics, very much the
role of populist scapegoat of self doubt about structural injustice that

89. SeegeneraIIyROBERTH.BORK, THETEMPTINGOFAMmCA:THEPOLTICALSEDUCnON
OF THE LAW (1990) (typifying Bork's views). For criticism, see generally David A.J. Richards,
Originalism Without Foundations, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1373 (1990); see also RiCHARDS,
FOUNDATIONS, supranote 11, at 202-47, 288-89.

90. See generally JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JuDiciAL
REVIEW (1980) (exemplifying Bork's views). For criticism, see RicHARDs, CONSCIENCE, supra
note 12, at 9-12, ch.8.
91. RICHARDS, WOMEN, GAYS, AND THE CONSTrrUTION, supra note 13, at 261 (quoting
Sarah M. Grimke, Letters on the Equality of the Sexes and the Conditionof Women, in THE PUBUC
YEARS 234). See also id. at 42, 302.
92. See RiCHARDS, WOMEN, GAYS, AND THE CONSTITUTION, supranote 13, at 4, 66-67, 9094, 105-06, 113-14, 130-31, 142, 160, 178, 180, 182, 261-63, 275, 321,467.
93. See id. at ch. 6.
94. See generally id.
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African-Americans and women occupied in the antebellum period. In
particular, reasonable doubts about the degree to which gender roles in
public and private life have been squared with the demands ofjustice are
suppressed by the irrational scapegoating of a traditionally stigmatized
minority because they challenge such gender roles; in effect, their claims for
the basic human rights of intimate life and to be free of unjust gender
discrimination, now liberally extended to heterosexual men and women, are
parodied as attacks on "family values." Against this background, the need
for their protection, on grounds of basic constitutional principle, is, I argue,
all the more exigent."
This general perspective puts in a quite different light Dean Allen's
worries about the role decadent forms of social contract theory may play
or have played in the rationalization of injustice. As we have seen, the
political force of structural injustice familiarly rationalizes itself by decadent
inversions of both fact and theory, and contractualism is no more exempt
from this than any other normative theory. Such decadence, though, cannot
be the measure of more impartial and critically self-conscious uses of such
theory, particularly in light of the significant role contractualist theory has
played and continues to play in the most important dissenting movements
of progressive moral emancipation in our history as a people (including the
struggle of African-Americans, women, and gays and lesbians).
It is an important feature of these dissenting movements that they are
critically concerned with precisely what worries Dean Allen in decadent
forms of social contract theory-namely, the degree to which structural
injustice is naturalized. Indeed, as we have seen, the ethical impulse of
contractualism was its insistence of the need for more impartial tests of the
justifiability of political power growing out of concern with the degree to
which illegitimate abuses of such power corrupted conscience itself.
Contractualism, properly understood, has thus played a powerful role in the
identification and understanding of structural injustice; what unifies the
concern with structural injustice in all its domains is the way in which
putatively natural facts (race or gender or gendered sexuality) have been
supposed to rationalize such injustice. Contractualist theory, properly
understood and elaborated, has indispensably assisted in recognizing and
remedying this problem by its development of reasonable tests for the
existence of such unjust cultural patterns (including their dependence on the
corruption ofpublic reason) and the corresponding responsibility to rectify
them. It is indeed one of the best normative tools we have available in our
tradition for understanding and evaluating the continuing role played in our
culture by the populist naturalization of structural injustice.
We need more attempts like Dean Allen's to take seriously the role of

95. See id. at chs. 6-8.
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social contract theory in American law. I have not disagreed with many of
her analyses of particular cases, which cluster in other areas of law than
those that have been my concern here. Indeed, I share many of her views
and concerns. But, her interpretive approach is, I have suggested,
problematic in two ways. It includes cases (in which "social contract," etc.
happen to occur) that are not plausibly connected to contractualism, and
fails to include cases which are deeply contractualist. The latter problem
includes failure to examine and consider a range of important cases in the
struggle for justice in the United States. For this reason, some of Dean
Allen's criticisms ofcontractualism fail to take into account and give weight
to some compelling counterexamples. To do justice to these difficulties, an
interpretive approach must be, I have suggested, both more philosophical
and more historical. On the one hand, an investigation of the contractualist
foundations of a body of law must bring to its interpretive inquiry an
articulate sense ofthe distinctive philosophical claims ofcontractualism. On
the other, the interpretation must, as I have suggested, take a broad
historical perspective on its subject matter, including the periods ofpolitical
decadence marked by their betrayal of contractualist principles. Such
historical study enables us to understand the morally progressive role of
contractualist impartiality in challenging such decadence, and the ways in
which its challenge has been and continues to be resisted (originalism and
majoritarianism).
We should be concerned, as Dean Allen cautions us, about the abuses
of theory in law, in particular, when such theory serves to rationalize
injustice. We need also to be clear, on the basis of a longer interpretive
perspective on American constitutional history, about the nature, weight,
and uses of a demanding moral perspective like contractualist impartiality.
As we have seen, it has repeatedly assisted us in recognizing and remedying
the evils of structural injustice (scapegoating victims of injustice) that have
often been most invisible to our sometimes complacent, self-congratulatory
politics. These evils persist. The moral demands of contractualist
impartiality (including its skepticism about the enforcement through law of
sectarian political epistemologies) are, correspondingly, much needed to
combat the illegitimate force of such populist prejudice in our politics.
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